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Abstract
We exploit a simple but realistic model of trooper behavior to design empirical tests that
address the following two questions. Are police monolithic in their search behavior? Is racial
profiling in motor vehicle searches motivated by troopers’ desire for eﬀective policing (statistical
discrimination) or by their racial prejudice (racism)? Our tests require data sets with race
information about both the motorists and troopers. When applied to vehicle stop and search
data from Florida, our tests can soundly reject the null hypothesis that troopers of diﬀerent
races are monolithic in their search behavior, but fail to reject the null hypothesis that none of
the racial groups of troopers are racially prejudiced.
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Introduction
Black motorists in the United States are much more likely than white motorists to be searched by

highway troopers. Several recent lawsuits against state governments have used this racial disparity
in treatment as evidence of “racial profiling,” a term that refers to the police practice of using
a motorist’s race as one of the criteria in their motor vehicle search decisions. Racial profiling
originated with the attempt to interdict the flow of drugs from Miami up Interstate 95 to the cities
of the Northeast. For example, in 1985 the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor
Vehicles issued guidelines for police on “The Common Characteristics of Drug Couriers,” in which
race/ethnicity was explicitly mentioned as one characteristic (Engel, Calnon and Bernard, 2002).
While the initial motivation for such guidelines may have been to increase the troopers’ eﬀectiveness
in interdicting drugs, it also unfortunately opened up the possibility for troopers to engage in racist
practices against minority motorists.
Following the public backlash generated by several cases in the 1990s such as Wilkins v. Maryland State Police [1996] and Chavez v. Illinois State Police [1999], almost all highway patrol
departments have denounced using race as a criterion in stop and search decisions. But many citizens, especially minorities, are skeptical of this claim: motor vehicle search decisions, by their very
nature, are made in the midst of face-to-face interactions, and thus it is simply hard to imagine
that troopers can block the race and ethnicity information that a motorist presents. Moreover,
data on trooper searches continue to show that they tend to search a higher proportion of minority
motorists than white motorists. As is now well known, however, racial disparities in the aggregate
rates of stops and searches do not necessarily imply racial prejudice (see, for example, Knowles,
Persico and Todd 2001, Engel, Calnon and Bernard 2002). If, for example, black drivers are more
likely than white drivers to carry contraband, then the aggregate rate of stops and searches would
be higher for black drivers even when race was hypothetically invisible to troopers. Moreover,
racial profiling may also arise if police attempt to maximize successful searches and race helps
predict whether a driver carries contraband. This situation is called statistical discrimination in
the terminology of Arrow (1973).
How can we empirically distinguish racism from statistical discrimination? This question has
garnered enormous public and academic interest (see, for example, National Research Council
2004), but it is also challenging, partly as a result of data limitations. For example, unless truly
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random searches are conducted, researchers typically will not observe the true proportion of drivers
who carry contraband. Ethnographic studies such as Sherman (1980) and Riksheim and Chermak
(1993) have shown that many situational factors, including suspects’ demeanor in the police-citizen
encounter, influence police behavior. Such data are also typically unavailable. Because we have
no way of controlling for all of the legitimate factors that might cause minority drivers to be
searched with higher probability than white motorists, it becomes very diﬃcult to determine the
true motivation behind racial profiling with the available data.
A seminal paper by Knowles, Persico and Todd (2001, KPT hereafter) developed a simple but
elegant theoretical model about motorist and police behavior that suggests an empirical test using
data on search outcomes (i.e., the percent of searches in which contraband was found) for each
racial group — a statistic typically available to researchers.1 The primary idea of KPT’s empirical
test comes from the outcome test originated by Becker (1957).2 It is based on the following
intuitive notion. If troopers are profiling minority motorists due to racial prejudice, they will
search minorities even when the returns from searching them, i.e., the probabilities of successful
searches against minorities, are smaller than those from searching whites. More precisely, if racial
prejudice is the reason for racial profiling, then the success rate of the marginal minority motorist
(i.e., the last minority motorist deemed suspicious enough to be searched) will be lower than the
success rate of the marginal white motorist. In contrast, if racial profiling results from statistical
discrimination (i.e., if the troopers are profiling to maximize the number of successful searches),
then the optimality condition would require that the search success rate for the marginal minority
motorist be equal to that of the marginal white motorist. While this idea has been well understood,
it is problematic in empirical applications because researchers will never be able to directly observe
the search success rate of the marginal motorist. Instead we can only observe the average success
rate of white and minority searches. Precisely for this reason, KPT proposed a simple model
of motorist and police behavior to cleverly circumvent this problem. In their model, motorists
diﬀer in their characteristics, including race and possibly other characteristics (that are observable
to troopers but may or may not be available to researchers). Troopers decide whether to search
motorists and motorists decide whether to carry contraband. In this “matching pennies”-like model
they show that, if troopers are not racially prejudiced, then all motorists, regardless of their race
1

The ideas in our paper are inspired from reading KPT, from which we learned a great amount.
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See, also, Ayres (2001) for other applications of the outcome test idea.
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and other characteristics, would in equilibrium carry contraband with equal probability, and thus
there is no diﬀerence between the marginal and the average search success rates.3 Their model thus
suggests a simple test based on the comparison of the average search success rate by the race of the
motorists. A lower average search success rate implies racial prejudice against that group. Applying
their test to a data set of 1,590 searches on a stretch of the I-95 in Maryland from January 1995
through January 1999, they find no evidence of racial prejudice against African-American motorists,
but do find evidence of racial prejudice against Hispanics.
KPT’s model of motorist and police behavior provides a theoretical rationale for using the
average search success rates as the basis of an empirical test for racial prejudice. Therefore, the
validity of the test also hinges on the realism of the model that justifies it. We now present two
weaknesses of their model.4
First, KPT’s model predicts that all motorists for a given race, regardless of their other characteristics that may be observed by the police, will carry contraband with equal probability. This
is the vital prediction that allows them to equate the average search success rate in a given racial
group of motorists to the marginal search success rate. This, however, also implies that a motorist’s
characteristics other than race should provide no information when a trooper decides whether to
search. This implication of police behavior goes against trooper guidelines which require them to
base their search decisions on the information the motorist presents to the trooper at the time
of the stop, including the motorist’s personal characteristics, their demeanor, and the contents of
their vehicle that are in plain view, etc. (see, e.g., Sherman 1980 and Riksheim and Chermak
1993). KPT’s basic model assumes that motorists’ characteristics are exogenous, thus ruling out
the plausible scenario that a motorist’s demeanor when stopped is intimately related to whether or
3

They of course allow the motorists with diﬀerent characteristics to have diﬀerent costs and benefits from carrying

contrand. These diﬀerences, however, only imply that in equilibrium troopers will search motorists with diﬀerent
characteristics at diﬀerent rates. In fact, these diﬀerent search rates provide the necessary deterrence to ensure that
all motorists will carry contrand with equal probabilities.
4

Dharmapala and Ross (2003) also point out that KPT’s test does not generalize if potential drug carriers may

not be observed by the police or if there are diﬀerent levels of drug oﬀense severity. In the first case, the equilibrium
of the model may involve a group of motorists carrying drugs with probability one even when they are searched
with probability one whenever the troopers observe them (KPT recognized this issue in their footnote 16). If the
probability of being a “dealer” is higher for minorities, then the average success rate for minorities should be greater
than that for whites under statistical discrimination, and equal average success rates would actually indicate taste
discrimination, contrary to KPT’s conclusion. In the second case, KPT’s test has to be modified.
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not he or she is carrying contraband.
Second, KPT (and this field of research in general) assume that all troopers’ behavior is monolithic. Due to lack of data on the characteristics, including race information, of troopers, it is
assumed that all troopers have the same racial prejudice against motorists, regardless of their race.
While there is no direct evidence on this assumption in the context of highway searches, Donohue
and Levitt (2001), in their study on arrest patterns and crime, find that the racial composition
of a city’s police force has an important impact on the racial patterns of arrests, suggesting that
police behavior (or information they possess) is not monolithic. The consequence of an invalid
monolithic trooper behavior assumption is serious. Imagine a world in which minority troopers are
racially prejudiced against white motorists, while white troopers are prejudiced against minority
motorists. It is possible that when examining the aggregate search outcomes of white and minority
troopers, we would reach a conclusion that the police as a whole are not racially prejudiced. But
this seriously underestimates the harassment experienced by both white and minority motorists.
In this paper, we develop an alternative model of motorist and police behavior in which troopers
are allowed to behave diﬀerently depending on their own race and the race of the motorists they
interact with.5 Our model does not yield the convenient, but in our view unrealistic, implication
that all drivers of the same race carry contraband with the same probability. As a result, the
distinction between average and marginal search success rates becomes, yet again, the central issue
in the empirical determination of racial prejudice versus statistical discrimination. Our model
follows the spirit of labor market statistical discrimination models (see, e.g., Coate and Loury
1993). Police oﬃcers observe noisy but informative signals about whether or not a driver carries
contraband when they decide if a search is warranted. Guilty drivers, i.e., drivers who actually
carry contraband, are more likely than innocent drivers to generate suspicious signals. A police
oﬃcer incurs a cost of search t (rm ; rp ) that depends on both his/her own race rp and the race of
the motorist rm . Troopers of a particular race, say rp , are said to be racially prejudiced if their
cost of searching motorists depend on the race of the motorist. The police force exhibits nonmonolithic behavior if the cost of searching motorists of a given race rm depend on the race of the
5

We assume that race is the only characteristic of troopers that is likely to aﬀect their search behavior. This is

a plausible assumption because we are examining if troopers search white and minority motorists diﬀerently, so the
race of the trooper is the most likely characteristic to aﬀect their search patterns. We assume that within a trooper
racial group, all troopers are monolithic.
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trooper. Troopers are assumed to make their search decisions to maximize the number of successful
searches (or arrests). The optimal decision of a race-rp police oﬃcer in deciding whether a race-rm
motorist should be searched satisfies a threshold property: motorists should be searched if and only
if their posterior probability of being guilty exceeds the search cost of race-rp oﬃcers against racerm motorists, t (rm ; rp ) . We show that the police oﬃcers exhibit monolithic behavior if and only if
both the search rate and average search success rate of any given race of motorists are independent
of the race of the troopers conducting the search. Moreover, if none of the racial groups of troopers
are racially prejudiced, then the ranking across the race of troopers of search rates and average
search success rates for a given race of motorists should not depend on the race of the motorists.
That is, if troopers of race rp have a higher search rate against race-rm motorists than troopers of
0 motorists than
race rp0 , then race-rp troopers should also have a higher search rate against race-rm

race-rp0 troopers. We use these theoretical predictions of the model to design empirical tests for
both monolithic behavior and racial prejudice. Another nice feature of our model is that it could
potentially be refuted by the data we have available.
The implementation of our empirical tests relies on data sets that have race information on
both the troopers and motorists. While such data has not been available for use in earlier empirical
studies on racial profiling, we were able to obtain a data set from the Florida Highway Patrol which
contains information on all vehicle stops and searches conducted on Florida highways between
January 2000 and November 2001, together with the demographics of the trooper that conducted
each stop and search. In implementing our empirical tests, we find strong evidence that the Florida
Highway Patrol troopers do not exhibit monolithic behavior, but we fail to reject the null hypothesis
that none of the racial groups of troopers are racially prejudiced.
There is now a growing economics literature on the issue of empirical distinction between statistical discrimination and racial prejudice in motor vehicle searches. Hernandez-Murillo and Knowles
(2004) extend KPT’s test to the analysis of racial bias using only aggregate statistics, and apply
this new test to Missouri’s annual traﬃc-stop report for the year 2001. Antonovics and Knight
(2004) generalize KPT’s model to allow for trooper heterogeneity, and show that KPT’s tests are
not robust to such a generalization. As we do in our paper, they show that if oﬃcers of diﬀerent
races have the same search cost against motorists of a given race, then the search rate against these
motorists should be independent of the oﬃcers’ race. They run a Probit regression using data from
the Boston Police Department where the dependent variable is an indicator for whether a search
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took place for a given stop, and the explanatory variables include some observable characteristics of
the driver and oﬃcer and a dummy variable indicating whether there is a racial mismatch between
the oﬃcer and the driver. In their baseline regression, they find a positive coeﬃcient on the “racial
mismatch” variable, indicating that oﬃcers are more likely to conduct a search against motorists of
races diﬀerent from their own. They interpret this finding as evidence of racial prejudice. We argue
in subsection 2.1.2 that their interpretation of the evidence may be misleading. It is also useful
to point out that their data is from the Boston Police Department and consists mainly of stops
and searches in local neighborhoods. There are two potential problems with such data. First, as
Hernandez-Murillo and Knowles (2004) argued, many stops and searches conducted in local streets
are in response to specific crime reports. In these situations, oﬃcers tend to have less discretions
over who they search. Second, as argued by Donohue and Levitt (2001), for stops and searches
conducted in local neighborhoods, it is much more likely that oﬃcers of diﬀerent races may possess
diﬀerent amounts of information regarding a motorist, as residents in the neighborhood may be
more willing to share information with oﬃcers with the same race as theirs. In contrast, our data
consists only of stops and searches conducted on highways, and as a result the above two issues are
less concerning.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents and analyzes our model
of trooper search behavior, and proposes empirical tests based on the theoretical predictions of the
model; Section 3 describes the data set from the Florida Highway Patrol, presents our test results,
and contrasts our results with those using KPT’s test; Section 4 concludes. In Appendix A we
present a simple equilibrium model of drug carrying behavior to show that our focus on trooper
behavior in Section 2 is not problematic.

2

The Model
We now present a simple model of trooper search behavior that underlines the empirical work

in Section 3.2.6 There is a continuum of troopers (interchangeably, police oﬃcers) and motorists
(interchangeably, drivers). Let rm and rp ∈ {M, W } denote the race of the motorists and the
6

Borooah (2001) develops a somewhat related model of policing behavior.
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troopers respectively, where M stands for minorities and W for whites.7 Suppose that among
motorists of race rm ∈ {M, W } , a fraction πrm ∈ (0, 1) of them carry contraband.8,9
The information that is available to an oﬃcer when he or she makes the search decision consists
of the motorist’s race and many other characteristics pertaining to the motorist. Such characteristics
may include, for example, the gender, age and residential address of the driver, the interior of the
vehicle that is in the trooper’s view, the smell from the driver or the vehicle, whether the driver
is intoxicated, the demeanor of the driver in answering the trooper’s questions, the make of the
car, whether the car has an out-of-state plate, whether the car is rented or owned, location and
time of the stop, as well as the seriousness of the reason for the stop, etc.10 Note that while the
police oﬃcer observes all the characteristics in the decision to search, a researcher will typically
have access to only a small subset of them. We assume, however, that the police oﬃcer will use a
single-dimensional index θ ∈ [0, 1] that summarizes all of the information that these characteristics
indicate about the likelihood that a driver may be carrying contraband. We assume that, if a
driver of race rm ∈ {M, W } actually carries contraband, then the index θ is randomly drawn from

a continuous probability density distribution fgrm (·) ; if a race rm driver does not carry contraband,

θ would be randomly drawn from fnrm (·).11 Without loss of generality, we can assume that the
two densities fgrm and fnrm satisfy the strict monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP), i.e., for
rm ∈ {M, W } ,
MLRP: fgrm (θ) /fnrm (θ) is strictly increasing in θ.
The MLRP property on the signal distributions essentially means that a higher index θ is a
7

In the empirical part of the paper, we will examine three racial or ethnic groups: whites, blacks, and Hispanics.

For now, though, we group blacks and Hispanics together as minorities for ease of exposition.
8

For the purpose of deriving our empirical test, we will assume that π rm is exogenous. For an equilibrium model

in which π rm is endogenously determined, see Appendix A.
9

A trooper must first stop the motorist prior to a search. Examining the possibility of racial prejudice in highway

stops is beyond the scope of this paper. In our analysis, we will take the sample of cars that are stopped as our
population and focus solely on determining racial prejudice in troopers’ search decisions. The presence, or lack therof,
of racial prejudice at the stop level should not aﬀect our conclusions.
10

The questions the trooper will ask the motorist are typically focused on where the motorist is headed and the

purpose of their visit. In listening to the response the trooper will try to discern how nervous or defensive the motorist
is, and how logical the motorist’s response is.
11

The subscripts g and n stand for “guilty” and “not guilty,” respectively.
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signal that a driver is more likely to be guilty.12 To the extent that there may be obviously guilty
drivers (for example, if illicit drugs are in plain view), we assume that:
Unbounded Likelihood Ratio: fgrm (θ) /fnrm (θ) → +∞ as θ → 1.
The MLRP also implies that the cumulative distribution function Fgrm (·) first order stochastically dominates Fnrm (·), which implies that drivers who actually carry contraband are more likely
to generate higher and thus more suspicious signals. We think this single dimensional index formulation summarizes the information that is available to troopers when they make their search
decisions on the highway in a simple but realistic manner.
Each police oﬃcer can choose to search a vehicle after observing the driver’s vector (rm , θ),
where rm is the driver’s race and θ is the single-dimensional index that summarizes all other
characteristics observed during the stop. We assume that a trooper wants to maximize the total
number of convictions (or the number of drivers found carrying illicit contraband) minus a cost of
searching cars.13 This is an important assumption because it requires that police oﬃcers always
use any statistical information contained in the race of the motorist in their search decisions.14
Let t (rm ; rp ) be the cost of a police oﬃcer with race rp searching a motorist with race rm , where
rp , rm ∈ {M, W } . We normalize the benefit of each arrest (or successful drug find) to equal one,
and scale the search cost to be a fraction of the benefit, so that t (rm ; rp ) ∈ (0, 1) for all rm , rp . It
is worth emphasizing that, diﬀerent from KPT, we allow the troopers’ cost of searching a vehicle
to depend on the races of both the motorist and the oﬃcer, and thus we can directly confront the
possibility that police oﬃcers may not be monolithic in their search behavior.
Let G denote the event that the motorist searched is found with illicit drugs in the vehicle.
When a police oﬃcer observes a motorist of race rm and signal θ, the posterior probability that
such a motorist may be guilty of carrying contraband, Pr (G|rm , θ) , is obtained via Bayes’ rule:
Pr (G|rm , θ) =
12

πrm fgrm

πrm fgrm (θ)
.
(θ) + (1 − πrm ) fnrm (θ)

For any one dimensional index θ, we can always reorder them according to their likelihood ratio fgrm (θ) /fnrm (θ)

in an ascending order. Thus the MLRP assumption is with no loss of generality.
13

This is also the police objective postulated in KPT. It is a plausible assumption because awards (such as Trooper

of the Month honors) and/or promotion decisions are partly based on troopers’ success in catching motorists with
contraband.
14

This assumption rules out the possibility that some oﬃcers ignore the race of a motorist even when it provides

useful information.
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It immediately follows from the MLRP that Pr (G|rm , θ) is monotonically increasing in θ. From the
unbounded likelihood ratio assumption, we know that Pr (G|rm , θ) → 1 as θ → 1.
The decision problem faced by a police oﬃcer of race rp when facing a motorist with race rm
and signal θ is thus as follows:
max {Pr (G|rm , θ) − t (rm ; rp ) ; 0}
where the first term is the expected benefit from searching such a motorist and the second term is
the benefit from not searching, which is normalized to zero. Thus the optimal decision for a trooper
of race rp is to search a race-rm motorist with signal θ if and only if
Pr (G|rm , θ) ≥ t (rm ; rp ) .
From the monotonicity of Pr (G|rm , θ) in θ, we thus conclude:
Proposition 1 A race-rp police oﬃcer will search a race-rm motorist if and only if
θ ≥ θ∗ (rm ; rp )
where θ∗ (rm ; rp ) is uniquely determined by
Pr (G|rm , θ∗ (rm ; rp )) = t (rm ; rp ) .
Moreover, the search threshold θ ∗ (rm ; rp ) is monotonically increasing in t (rm ; rp ) .
Proposition 1 says that the probability of a successful search for the marginal motorist is equal
to the cost of search. Any infra-marginal motorist will have a higher search success probability. In
what follows, we will refer to θ∗ (rm ; rp ) as the equilibrium search criterion of race-rp police oﬃcers
against race-rm motorists. We define the equilibrium search rate of race-rp police oﬃcers against
race-rm motorists as γ (rm ; rp ) , which is given by
¤
£
γ (rm ; rp ) = πrm 1 − Fgrm (θ∗ (rm ; rp )) + (1 − πrm ) [1 − Fnrm (θ ∗ (rm ; rp ))] .

(1)

The equilibrium average search success rate of race-rp police oﬃcers against race-rm motorists,
denoted by S (rm ; rp ), is given by
£
¤
πrm 1 − Fgrm (θ ∗ (rm ; rp ))
S (rm ; rp ) = rm
.
π [1 − Fgrm (θ∗ (rm ; rp ))] + (1 − πrm ) [1 − Fnrm (θ∗ (rm ; rp ))]
9

(2)

We now introduce three definitions. First, a police oﬃcer of race rp is defined to be racially
prejudiced if he or she exhibits a preference for searching motorists of one race. Following KPT,
we model this preference in the cost of searching motorists.
Definition 1 A police oﬃcer of race rp is racially prejudiced, or has a taste for discrimination, if
t (M; rp ) 6= t (W ; rp ) .
Next, we say that police do not exhibit monolithic behavior if oﬃcers of diﬀerent races do not
use the same search criterion when dealing with motorists of some race.
Definition 2 The police oﬃcers do not exhibit monolithic behavior if t (rm ; M) 6= t (rm ; W ) for
some rm ∈ {M, W } .
Note that a monolithic police force does not mean that they are not racially prejudiced: it could
be that police oﬃcers of both races are equally prejudiced against some race of motorists. Likewise,
a non-monolithic police force does not necessarily imply that some racial group of troopers are
racially prejudiced: it could be that each group of troopers has the same search cost against all
groups of motorists, but that search costs depend on the race of the trooper.
Finally, we say that race-rp police oﬃcers exhibit statistical discrimination if they have no taste
for discrimination and yet they use diﬀerent search criterion against motorists with diﬀerent races.
Definition 3 Assume t (M ; rp ) = t (W ; rp ) . Then race-rp police oﬃcers exhibit statistical discrimination if θ∗ (M; rp ) 6= θ∗ (W ; rp ) .
Oﬃcers will choose to use statistical discrimination if the distribution of the signal θ among
white and minority motorists is diﬀerent. When these distributions diﬀer and t (M; rp ) = t (W ; rp )
(as assumed), Proposition 1 implies that the race-rp police will choose search criteria θ∗ (M ; rp ) and
θ∗ (W ; rp ) so that the marginal search success rates against white and minority motorists are both
equal to the search cost. This typically implies that θ∗ (M; rp ) 6= θ∗ (W ; rp ). One reason why the
distribution of the signal θ might be diﬀerent across motorists of diﬀerent races is that one group
might be more likely to carry contraband. For example, if minority drivers are more likely to carry
contraband (πW < πM ), then it will be optimal for a non-prejudiced oﬃcer to search relatively
more minority drivers (assume everything else is the same for white and minority drivers), and
thus they will set θ ∗ (M; rp ) < θ ∗ (W ; rp ). Another reason why the distribution of θ might be
10

diﬀerent for whites and minorities is that fgrm (θ) and fnrm (θ) can diﬀer between motorist races.
For example, minority drivers not carrying contraband might tend to be more nervous during a
stop than whites.15
Now we derive some simple implications of the model that will serve as the basis of our empirical
test. First, note that if police oﬃcers are monolithic, then the cost of searching any given race of
motorists is the same, regardless of the race of the oﬃcer. That is, t (W ; W ) = t (W ; M) and
t (M; W ) = t (M; M). If we assume that white and minority troopers face the same population of
white motorists and the same population of minority motorists, then Proposition 1 implies that
both races of oﬃcers will use the same search criterion against a given race of motorists, so that
θ∗ (W ; W ) = θ ∗ (W ; M) and θ ∗ (M; W ) = θ ∗ (M; M) .16 Thus following from the formula for the
search rate (1) and average search success rate (2), we have:
Proposition 2 If the police oﬃcers exhibit monolithic behavior, then γ (rm ; M) = γ (rm ; W ) and
S (rm ; M ) = S (rm ; W ) for all rm ∈ {M, W } .
Next, if none of the police oﬃcers are racially prejudiced, then it immediately follows from
Definition 1 that the ranking of t (rm ; M) and t (rm ; W ) does not depend on the motorist’s race
rm , regardless of whether or not troopers are monolithic.17 We can illustrate the implication of
this using an example where white troopers find searching both minority and white motorists more
costly than minority troopers do. More formally this can be written as t (M; M) = t (W ; M) <
t (M; W ) = t (W ; W ).18 Because the search threshold given in Proposition 1 is monotonically
increasing in t (rm ; rp ) and both white and minority troopers face the same population of white
15

This scenario is actually quite plausible. Because of the many documented bad past experiences minorities have

faced with oﬃcers, they might have a stigma that all police oﬃcers are out to get them and thus might be very
nervous during a stop even if they have not done anything wrong.
16

We will discuss the validity of this assumption in Section 2.2.

17

Consider, for illustrative purposes, the case that t(W ; M ) < t(W ; W ). Since race-M oﬃcers are assumed not to be

racially prejudiced, we have t (W ; M ) = t (M ; M ) . Similarly since race-W oﬃcers are not racially prejudiced, we have
t (W ; W ) = t (M ; W ) . Thus it must be the case t(M ; M ) < t(M ; W ). Thus t (rm ; M ) < t (rm ; W ) for all rm . Similar
arguments show that if t(W ; M ) > t(W ; W ), then we must have t(M ; M ) > t(M ; W ); and if t(W ; M ) = t(W ; W ) then
we must have t(M ; M ) = t(M ; W ). Thus the ranking of t(rm ; M ) and t(rm ; W ) does not depend on the motorist’s
race rm .
18

Note that the relationship t(M ; rp ) = t(W ; rp ) does not imply that θ∗ (M ; rp ) = θ∗ (W ; rp ), because troopers can

be engaged in statistical discrimination.
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and minority motorists, this implies that θ∗ (M; M) < θ∗ (M; W ) and θ∗ (W ; M) < θ∗ (W ; W ).
Because the equilibrium search rate given in formula (1) is monotonically decreasing in θ ∗ (rm ; rp ) ,
we immediately have that γ (M; M) > γ (M; W ) and γ (W ; M) > γ (W ; W ), so that race-M
oﬃcers’ search rates will be higher for both races of motorists. Similarly, if t(M; M) = t(W ; M) >
t(M; W ) = t(W ; W ), then race-M oﬃcers’ search rates will be lower for both rates of motorists
than race-W oﬃcers. Finally, if t(M; M) = t(W ; M) = t(M ; W ) = t(W ; W ), then race-M oﬃcers’
search rates will be equal to those of race-W oﬃcers for both races of motorists.
We can also show that if none of the police oﬃcers are racially prejudiced, then the rank order of
average search success rates between white and minority troopers for any race of motorists should
also be independent of the motorists’ race. Recall the previous example where white troopers had
a higher overall search cost than minority troopers. We showed this would imply that θ∗ (M; M) <
θ∗ (M; W ) and θ ∗ (W ; M) < θ∗ (W ; W ). The average search success rate with a search criterion θ ∗
against race-rm motorist is simply
¤
£
πrm 1 − Fgrm (θ∗ )
,
πrm [1 − Fgrm (θ∗ )] + (1 − πrm ) [1 − Fnrm (θ ∗ )]
and one can show that it is strictly increasing in θ∗ .19 Thus we have S (W ; M ) < S (W ; W ) and
S (M ; M) < S (M; W ) . That is, the ranking of S (rm ; M) and S (rm ; W ) does not depend on rm .
The above discussion is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 If neither race-M nor race-W of police oﬃcers exhibit racial prejudice, then neither
the ranking of γ (rm ; M) and γ (rm ; W ) nor the ranking of average search success rates S (rm ; M)
19

To see this, note that it will be strictly increasing in θ∗ if and only if
H (θ∗ ) =

is strictly increasing in θ∗ . Note that
0

∗

H (θ )

1 − Fgrm (θ∗ )
1 − Fnrm (θ∗ )

=

£
¤
−fgrm (θ∗ ) [1 − Fnrm (θ∗ )] + 1 − Fgrm (θ∗ ) fnrm (θ∗ )

=

−fgrm

=

R1 £
θ∗

From MLRP, we know that, for all θ > θ∗ ,

∗

(θ )

R1

f rm
θ∗ n

[1 − Fnrm (θ∗ )]2

(θ) dθ + fnrm (θ∗ )

[1 − Fnrm (θ∗ )]2

R1

θ∗

fgrm (θ) dθ

¤
fnrm (θ ∗ ) fgrm (θ) − fgrm (θ ∗ ) fnrm (θ) dθ
[1 − Fnrm (θ∗ )]2

fgrm (θ)
fgrm (θ∗ )
> rm ∗ ,
rm
fn (θ)
fn (θ )

thus the integrand in the numerator is always positive. Thus H 0 (θ ∗ ) > 0.
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.

and S (rm ; W ) depends on rm ∈ {M, W } . Moreover, for any rm , the ranking of γ (rm ; M) and
γ (rm ; W ) should be the exact opposite of the ranking of S (rm ; M) and S (rm ; W ) .
In our model if race-rp troopers are not racially prejudiced, we know that race-rp troopers’
marginal search success rate against white motorists will be equal to that against minority motorists. But because in our model the marginal motorist’s guilty probability is smaller than that of
the infra-marginal motorists, we can not conclude that race-rp troopers’ average search success rate
against white motorists will be equal to that against minority motorists. This is in stark contrast
to KPT’s model where there is no distinction between marginal and average motorists. Nonetheless, Proposition 3 provides testable implications of our model based on rank orders of observable
statistics — the search rates and the average search success rates.
The contrapositive of Proposition 3 is simply that, if the ranking of γ (rm ; M) and γ (rm ; W ) ,
or the ranking of S (rm ; M) and S (rm ; W ) , depend on rm , then at least one racial group of the
troopers exhibit racial prejudice. Without further assumptions, it is not possible to determine
which group of troopers are racially prejudiced.

2.1
2.1.1

Empirical Tests
Test for Monolithic Trooper Behavior

Proposition 2 suggests a test for whether troopers of diﬀerent races exhibit monolithic search
behavior that is implementable even when researchers have no access to the signals θ observed by
troopers in making their search decisions. Under the null hypothesis that police oﬃcers exhibit
monolithic behavior, then, for any race of drivers, the search rates and average search success rates
against drivers of that race should be independent of the race of the troopers that conduct the
searches. That is, under the null hypothesis of monolithic trooper behavior, we must have, for all
rm ∈ {M, W } ,
γ (rm ; M) = γ (rm ; W ) ,

(3)

S (rm ; M) = S (rm ; W ) .

(4)

Any evidence in violation of any of these equalities would reject the null hypothesis.
It is worth pointing out that both equalities (3) and (4) hold if and only if the null hypothesis
is true. To illustrate why this is true we need to show that when the null hypothesis is not true
13

we will never satisfy equality (3) and (4). Without loss of generality, suppose that troopers are not
monolithic in their search behavior against white motorists (rm = W ). That is, t(W ; W ) 6= t(W ; M).
If t(W ; W ) > t(W ; M), then, because both white and minority troopers face the same population
of white motorists, we know from Proposition 1 that θ∗ (W ; W ) > θ∗ (W ; M), i.e. white troopers
will use a more strict search criterion than minority troopers when searching white motorists. This
then simultaneously implies that γ(W ; W ) < γ(W ; M) and that S(W ; W ) > S(W ; M), following
from the proof in footnote 19. Thus the test using either (3) and (4) has an asymptotic power of
one.
Moreover, the relationship between search rates and average search success rates suggests that,
in principle, our model can be refuted. According to our model, whenever γ(W ; W ) < γ(W ; M),
this must be because θ ∗ (W ; W ) > θ∗ (W ; M) which directly implies that S(W ; W ) > S(W ; M).
Thus if the rank order between the search rates between racial groups of troopers for a given race
of motorists is not exactly the opposite of the rank order between the average search success rates,
then we know that at least some of the conditions of our model are not satisfied.20
2.1.2

Test for Racial Prejudice

Proposition 3 suggests a test for whether some racial groups of troopers exhibit racial prejudice
in their search behavior. Under the null hypothesis that none of the racial groups of troopers have
racial prejudice, it must be true that both the ranking of search rates for a given race of motorists
rm across the races of troopers γ (rm ; M) and γ (rm ; W ), and the ranking of average search success
rates S (rm ; M) and S (rm ; W ) , do not depend on rm ∈ {M, W } . The null hypothesis will be
rejected if the ranking of γ (rm ; M) and γ (rm ; W ), or the ranking of S (rm ; M) and S (rm ; W ) ,
depends on the race of the motorists rm .
This test, however, has an asymptotic power less than one. That is, one may fail to reject the
null hypothesis even when it is false. To see this, suppose that the truth is t (M; M) = t (W ; M) <
t (M; W ) < t (W ; W ). That is, race-M oﬃcers are not racially prejudiced, but race-W oﬃcers are
prejudiced against minorities (race-W oﬃcers’ cost of searching minority motorists are smaller). In
this case, race-W oﬃcers will apply higher search criteria toward both races of motorists, and thus
the race-W oﬃcers’ search rates will be lower regardless of the race of the motorists. Thus the null
20

Of course, if the search rates between racial groups of troopers for a given race of motorists are equal, then the

average search success rates between racial groups of troopers for a given race of motorists must also be equal.
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would not be rejected even it is false and we commit a type-II error. This is a clear weakness of
this test. On the other hand, if we do find evidence against the null hypothesis, we are confident
that at least one racial group of troopers is racially prejudiced.21
Now we relate our test of racial prejudice to the test proposed in Antonovics and Knight (2004).
As we described in the introduction, they use evidence that police oﬃcers are more likely to conduct
a search if the race of the oﬃcer diﬀers from the race of the driver as evidence of racial prejudice.
First, it is useful to point out that their test is diﬀerent from our rank order test proposed above.
Consider the following simple example. Suppose that rm , rp ∈ {W, M} and let the search rates
be as follows: γ (M; M) = .05, γ (W ; M) = .10, γ (M; W ) = .20 and γ (W ; W ) = .15. That is,
minority oﬃcers are more likely to search white motorists than minority motorists, and white
oﬃcers are more likely to search minority motorists than white motorists. Thus oﬃcers in this
example are more likely to conduct a search if the race of the motorist is diﬀerent from their own,
causing Antonovics and Knight’s test to conclude that racial prejudice is occurring. However, such
patterns of search rates satisfy our rank independence condition, that is, γ (rm ; W ) > γ (rm ; M ) for
rm ∈ {W, M} , and thus our test would not consider this as evidence of racial prejudice. Antonovics
and Knight’s inference is not justified in our theoretical model without making further assumptions
on the signal distributions fgrm and fnrm .

2.2

Discussion of Two Key Assumptions

We made two key assumptions in the description of the model that play important roles in our
empirical methodology.
Assumption on the Pool of Motorists Faced by Troopers of Diﬀerent Races. In the
model, we assume that the fraction of race-rm motorists carrying contraband πrm ∈ (0, 1) does not
depend on the race of the troopers searching them. That is, we assumed that the pools of motorists
faced by troopers of diﬀerent races are the same. This assumption may not be empirically valid if
white and minority troopers are systematically assigned to patrol in diﬀerent locations or time of
day (indeed, our raw data indicated that this is the case, see Tables 3 and 4).
21

If we were to willing to assume that the signal distributions fgrm and fnrm do not depend on rm , then one can

derive more powerful tests for racial prejudice. But we think such restrictions are too strong to be realistic in empirical
applications.
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We now propose an empirical method that can resolve this problem even when the raw data
does not satisfy this condition. For illustration purposes, suppose that there are two troop stations
1 and 2, each with 100 oﬃcers. Suppose that in troop station 1, 80 oﬃcers are white and 20 are
minorities; in station 2, 60 oﬃcers are white and 40 are minorities. Thus, on average 70 percent
of the troopers are white and 30 percent are minorities. If the motorists that drive through the
patrol areas of stations 1 and 2 diﬀer in their characteristics, then the assumption that on average
white and minority troopers face the same pool of motorists may be invalid. To deal with this issue
we create artificial samples in the following way. We keep all the minority oﬃcers (20 of them)
in station 1, but randomly select 47 out of the 80 white oﬃcers. Similarly, we keep all the white
oﬃcers (60 of them) in station 2, but randomly select 26 out of the 40 minority oﬃcers. Thus we
create an artificial sample of 107 white oﬃcers and 46 minority oﬃcers. Among the 153 oﬃcers in
the artificial sample, (roughly) 70 percent of them are whites and 30 percent are minorities, and
they are equally likely to be assigned to stations 1 and 2. We can calculate the various search rates
and average search success rates in this artificial sample. To alleviate the sampling error, we use
independent resampling to create a list of such artificial data sets.
This resampling method can eﬀectively ensure that, when we calculate the search rates and
average search success rates, the white and minority oﬃcers in the sample are assigned to diﬀerent
trooper stations with equal probability. Thus on average, white and minority oﬃcers are facing the
same pool of motorists.
Assumption on the Signal Distributions. In the model we allow the signal distributions fgrm
and fnrm to be specific to the racial group of the drivers. This flexibility is important if we intend
to use our model as a basis for empirical test. As explained earlier, black and white drivers may
exhibit diﬀerent characteristics in their encounters with highway troopers, and thus imposing fgM
and fnM to be equal to fgW and fnW , respectively would be very strong and may be empirically
implausible. Also note that, since θ is most likely not observable by researchers, we do not want
to impose parametric distributional assumptions.
Despite this flexibility, our formulation does assume that the signals of race rm motorists are
drawn from the same distributions independent of police oﬃcers’ race. For example, we do not allow
for the possibility that minority drivers will present a signal that is drawn from one distribution
when they are stopped by a minority trooper and another signal that is drawn from a diﬀerent
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distribution when they are stopped by a white trooper. This would be a suspicious assumption, for
example, if the stops and searches occur in local streets. As argued in Donohue and Levitt (2001),
a black community may be more willing to cooperate with a black oﬃcer, and thus black oﬃcers
may obtain more information about a black motorist on the streets. However, we maintain that
this is a realistic assumption in highway searches. When stopping a black driver on highways, a
trooper typically does not have any other citizens to rely on for additional information. Thus any
informational advantage that black troopers have about black motorists may not be applicable on
the highways. Thus as long as white and black troopers observe the same list of characteristics and
summarize them in the same way, this is a valid assumption.
One may also argue that minority drivers might be more nervous with white oﬃcers than they
are with minority oﬃcers, regardless of whether or not they are carrying contraband. But as long as
white oﬃcers properly take this fact into account, they should put a lower weight on the observed
nervousness from a black motorist when they formulate the signal index θ. Thus this argument
does not necessarily invalidate our assumption that fgrm and fnrm do not depend on the race of the
police oﬃcers rp .

3

Empirical Results

3.1

Data Description

We now apply the tests described above to data from the Florida State Highway Patrol. The
Florida data is composed of two parts. The first is the traﬃc data set that consists of all the
stops and searches conducted on all Florida highways from January 2000 to November 2001. For
each of the stops in the data set, it includes (among other things) the date, exact time, county,
driver’s race, gender, ethnicity, age, reason for stop, whether a search was conducted, rationale
for search, type of contraband seized, and the ID number of the trooper who conducted the stop
and/or search. This part of the data is similar to those used in earlier studies of racial profiling
(e.g. KPT 2001 and Gross and Barnes 2002).22 The unique feature of our data set is the second
part, which is the personnel data that contains information on each of the troopers that conducted
the stops and searches in the traﬃc data set, including their ID number, date of birth, date of
22

Even though KPT have data on the stops, they did not use them in their analysis. Gross and Barnes (2002)

provided some basic statistics about the stop data.
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hiring, race, gender, rank, and base troop station. We merge the traﬃc data and the personnel
data by the unique trooper ID number that appears in both data sets. The merged data set thus
provides information about the demographics of the trooper that made each stop and search. After
eliminating cases in which there was missing information on the demographics of the trooper that
conducted the stop, we end up with 906,339 stops and 8,976 searches conducted by a total of 1,469
troopers.23 Florida State Highway Patrol troopers are assigned to one of ten trooper stations.
Except for trooper station K, which is in charge of the Florida Turnpike, all other stations cover
fixed counties. Figure 1 shows the coverage area of diﬀerent troop stations.

3.2
3.2.1

Empirical Findings
Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 summarizes the means of the variables related to the motorists in our sample. Of
the 906, 339 stops we observe, 66.5 percent were carried out against white motorists, 17.3 percent
against Hispanic motorists, and 16.2 percent against blacks. In all race categories of the motorists,
male motorists account for at least 67 percent of the stopped motorists for all race categories.
Among all the motorists that were stopped, 48 percent were in the 16-30 age group, 33.6 percent
were in the 31-45 age group and 18.3 percent were 46 and older. Close to 90 percent of stopped
motorists have in-state license plates, and close to 70 percent of the stops were conducted in the
day time (defined to be between 6am and 6pm).
Of the 8,976 searches we observe, 54.6 percent were performed on white motorists, 23.4 percent
on Hispanic motorists, and 22.1 percent against blacks. In all race categories, more than 80 percent
of searches were performed on male motorists, and overall, 84.8 percent of searches were against
male drivers. Among the motorists that were searched, 58.4 percent were in the 16-30 age group,
31.7 percent were in the 31-45 age group and only 9.9 percent were in the 46 and older age group.
Vehicles with in-state plates account for 85.7 percent of the searches, and 52.5 percent of the searches
were conducted at night (recall 30.3 percent of the stops were at night). 79.2 percent of searches
were not successful (they yielded nothing). Drugs were the most common contraband seized in
successful searches (15.1 percent of total searches), followed by alcohol/tobacco (2.1 percent) and
23

We also eliminated cases where the race of the motorist and trooper was not either white, black, or Hispanic,

since there are not enough observations of the other racial groups to consider them.
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Figure 1: Troop Station Coverage Map
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Stops

Searches

Motorists’

All

By Motorist Sex

All

By Motorist Sex

Characteristics

Stops

Female

Male

Searches

Female

Male

Black

.162 (.368)

.327 (.470)

.673 (.470)

.221 (.415)

.146 (.354)

.851 (.354)

Hispanic

.173 (.378)

.225 (.417)

.775 (.471)

.234 (.423)

.098 (.296)

.902 (.296)

White

.665 (.472)

.319 (.466)

.681 (.466)

.546 (.498)

.178 (.382)

.822 (.382)

Female

.304 (.460)

1.00 (.00)

0.00 (.00)

.152 (.359)

1.00 (.00)

0.00 (.00)

Male

.696 (.460)

0.00 (.00)

1.00 (.00)

.848 (.359)

0.00 (.00)

1.00 (.00)

16-30

.481 (.500)

.325 (.468)

.675 (.468)

.584 (.493)

.149 (.356)

.851 (.356)

31-45

.336 (.472)

.295 (.456)

.705 (.456)

.317 (.465)

.162 (.368)

.838 (.368)

46+

.183 (.386)

.269 (.444)

.731 (.444)

.099 (.299)

.136 (.343)

.864 (.343)

In-state

.899 (.302)

.310 (.462)

.690 (.462)

.857 (.350)

.155 (.362)

.845 (.362)

Out-of-state

.101 (.302)

.252 (.434)

.748 (.434)

.143 (.350)

.132 (.338)

.868 (.338)

Day (6am-6pm)

.697 (.459)

.316 (.465)

.684 (.465)

.475 (.499)

.161 (.367)

.839 (.367)

Night

.303 (.459)

.275 (.447)

.725 (.447)

.525 (.499)

.144 (.351)

.856 (.351)

None

.792 (.406)

.155 (.362)

.845 (.362)

Drugs

.151 (.358)

.137 (.344)

.863 (.344)

Paraphernalia

.015 (.122)

.156 (.364)

.844 (.364)

Currency

.003 (.051)

.174 (.388)

.826 (.388)

Vehicles

.010 (.100)

.154 (.363)

.846 (.363)

Alcohol/Tobacco

.021 (.142)

.151 (.359)

.849 (.359)

Weapons

.006 (.078)

.055 (.229)

.945 (.229)

Other

.003 (.049)

.318 (.477)

.682 (.477)

8,976

1,364

7,612

Age:

License Plate:

Time:

Contraband Seized:

Number of Observations:

906,339

275,527

Table 1: Means of Variables Related to Motorists.
Note: Standard errors of the means are shown in parentheses.
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630,812

drug paraphernalia (1.5 percent).
Table 2 summarizes the means of variables related to the troopers in our sample. The first
column shows that in our data, Blacks, Hispanic and whites account for 13.7, 10, and 76.3 percent
of the troopers respectively. 89 percent of the troopers are male. The second and the third columns
show that white troopers conducted 73 percent of all stops and 86 percent of all searches. The
corresponding numbers for black troopers are 16 and 4.6 percent; for Hispanic troopers they are
11.4 and 9.5 percent. Female troopers conducted 9.3 percent of all stops and 6.9 percent of all
searches.
3.2.2

Examining the Assumption that Troopers Face the Same Population of Motorists

Before we conduct our tests of monolithic behavior and racial prejudice we first examine whether
a crucial assumption of our test, that all troopers face the same population of motorists, are
satisfied in the raw data (before resampling). This assumption, of course, is not directly testable,
because πrm , fgrm (θ) , fnrm (θ) and θ are all unobservable. The best we can do is to examine the
distribution of observable motorist characteristics faced by troopers of diﬀerent races. Table 3
shows the proportions of stopped motorists with given characteristics faced by troopers of diﬀerent
races. The characteristics of motorists reported in the table include race, gender, age, and time
of the stops. For each row, we also report in the last column the p-values for Pearson χ2 tests of
the null hypothesis that the proportions of stopped motorists with the characteristics specific to
that row are the same for all three race groups of the troopers. As one can see, the hypothesis
that troopers of diﬀerent races face the same population of motorists can be statistically rejected
in the raw data, even though the diﬀerences are numerically quite small. One may suspect that
the reason that troopers of diﬀerent races are stopping motorists with diﬀerent characteristics is
that Black, Hispanic and White troopers are assigned to diﬀerent troops. For example, Hispanic
troopers are likely to have an over-representation in Troop E (covering Miami in Dade County)
relative to Troop A and H (covering counties in the Florida Panhandle). Indeed, Table 4 shows
that the allocations of troopers of diﬀerent races to diﬀerent troops, and time of the assignment,
do not seem random in the raw data. For this reason, we think it is important to conduct the
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Troopers

Stops

Searches

Troopers’

All

All

Characteristics

Troopers

Stops

Female

Male

Searches

Female

Male

.137

.160

.115

.885

.046

.044

.956

(.344)

(.366)

(.319)

(.319)

(.208)

(.206)

(.206)

.100

.114

.070

.930

.095

.025

.975

(.300)

(.318)

(.256)

(.256)

(.293)

(.155)

(.155)

.763

.726

.092

.908

.859

.076

.924

(.425)

(.446)

(.289)

(.289)

(.348)

(.265)

(.265)

.106

.093

1.00

0.00

.069

1.00

0.00

(.307)

(.291)

(.00)

(.00)

(.254)

(.00)

(.00)

.894

.907

0.00

1.00

.931

0.00

1.00

(.307)

(.291)

(.00)

(.00)

(.254)

(.00)

(.00)

.022

.002

.239

.761

.002

.474

.526

(.148)

(.041)

(.426)

(.426)

(.046)

(.513)

(.513)

.070

.013

.023

.977

.007

.000

1.000

(.255)

(.112)

(.151)

(.151)

(.081)

(.000)

(.000)

.145

.062

.054

.946

.053

.052

.948

(.352)

(.241)

(.226)

(.26)

(.224)

(.223)

(.223)

.147

.112

.068

.932

.071

.030

.970

(.354)

(.316)

(.252)

(.252)

(.257)

(.170)

(.170)

.602

.810

.101

.899

.866

.073

.927

(.490)

(.392)

(.301)

(.301)

(.341)

(.261)

(.261)

Black

Hispanic

White

Female

Male

By Trooper Sex

All

By Trooper Sex

Ranks:
Captain

Lieutenant

Sergeant

Corporal

LEO

Table 2: Means of Variables Related to Troopers.
Note: Standard errors of the means are shown in parentheses.
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Motorist’s

Motorist’s

White

Black

Hispanic

Race

Characteristics

Troopers

Troopers

Troopers

White

Male

.679

.684

.701

<.001

Night stops

.288

.272

.318

<.001

Age: 16-30

.471

.460

.445

<.001

Age: 31-45

.325

.341

.349

0.02

Male

.671

.667

.686

<.001

Night stops

.332

.308

.354

<.001

Age: 16-30

.514

.514

.507

.001

Age: 31-45

.340

.344

.356

0.03

Male

.783

.774

.761

<.001

Night stops

.322

.288

.393

<.001

Age: 16-30

.516

.497

.494

<.001

Age: 31-45

.350

.363

.355

0.01

Black

Hispanic

p-value

Table 3: Distribution of Characteristics of Stopped Motorists, by Trooper Race in the Raw Data.
resampling methods we described in Subsection 2.2.24 By construction, in the artificial data we
created with the resampling method, troopers of a given race are assigned to diﬀerent troops with
the same probabilities. The Pearson’s χ2 test also reveal that in the artificial sample troopers of
diﬀerent races are assigned to night shifts with the same probability. Thus we can maintain out
hypothesis that the distribution of the observable characteristics of the stopped motorists faced by
troopers are the same in the artificial sample. We report our test results below using data from
the artificial samples.
24

One may argue that all of the stops occurred on Florida highways, and the drug flow in Florida tends to go

from Miami (a city in the southern tip of Florida) to cities in the northeastern United States; that is, drug couriers
are moving throughout Florida (except for possibly the panhandle). Thus troopers stationed in diﬀerent areas are
likely to face similar population of drivers, and the diﬀerences in the stopped motorists’ characteristics reflect the
diﬀerences in stop behavior of the troopers of diﬀerent races, rather than the diﬀerences in the driver population. It
is plausible, but in this paper we take the stopped motorists population as given.
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Troopers’ Race
White

Black

Hispanic

A

.930 (.256)

.054 (.227)

.016 (.124)

B

.889 (.316)

.081 (.274)

.030 (.172)

C

.816 (.389)

.116 (.321)

.068 (.253)

D

.793 (.406)

.117 (.322)

.090 (.287)

E

.412 (.494)

.236 (.426)

.352 (.479)

F

.880 (.326)

.056 (.231)

.063 (.245)

G

.833 (.374)

.135 (.343)

.032 (.176)

H

.886 (.320)

.114 (.320)

0.00 (.00)

K

.698 (.461)

.147 (.355)

.155 (.364)

L

.603 (.491)

.298 (.459)

.099 (.300)

.283 (.172)

.284 (.192)

.349 (.179)

Troop

% Night Stops

Table 4: Proportion of Troopers with Diﬀerent Races by Troop and Time Assignment in the Raw
Data.
Note: Standard errors of the means are shown in parentheses
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3.2.3

Test of Monolithic Behavior

We now implement our test for the hypothesis that troopers of diﬀerent races exhibit monolithic behavior. Table 5 is the main table. In Panel A, we show the search rate given stop for
motorist/trooper race pairs. For example, the first row shows that, of the white motorists stopped
by white, black and Hispanic troopers, respectively 0.96, 0.27 and 0.76 percent of them were
searched. The last column shows the p-value from the Pearson’s χ2 test under the null hypothesis
that troopers of all races search white motorists with equal probability. Specifically, the Pearson’s
χ2 test statistic under the null hypothesis all troopers with race in R search race-rm motorists with
equal probability is given by
X

rp ∈R

³

´2
\
\
γ (r
m ; rp ) − γ (rm )
\
γ (r
m ; rp )

∼ χ2 (R − 1) ,

\
where γ (r
m ; rp ) is the estimated search probability of race-rp oﬃcers against race-rm motorists,
γ\
(rm ) is the estimated search probability against race-rm motorists unconditional on the race of
the oﬃcer, and R is the cardinality of the set of troopers’ race categories, R.
Panel B presents the average search success rate for given motorist/trooper race pairs. The last
column in each row shows the p-value from the Pearson’s χ2 test under the null hypothesis that
troopers of all races have the same average search success rate against motorists of race in that
specific row. Again the Pearson’s χ2 test statistics under the null hypothesis that all troopers with
race in R have the same average search success rate against race-rm motorists is given by
³
´2
\
\
S
(r
;
r
)
−
S
(r
)
X
m p
m
∼ χ2 (R − 1) ,
\
S (rm ; rp )
rp ∈R
\
where S (r
m ; rp ) is the estimated average search success rate of race-rp oﬃcers against race-rm
motorists, and S\
(rm ) is the estimated average search success rate against race-rm motorists unconditional on the race of the oﬃcers.
As we argued in subsection 2.1.1, under the null hypothesis that troopers exhibit monolithic
behavior, γ (rm ; rp ) = γ (rm ) and S (rm ; rp ) = S (rm ) for all rp , and thus the Pearson’s χ2 test
statistic should be small under the null. The p-values in Table 5 show that we can soundly reject
the null hypothesis of monolithic trooper behavior.
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Motorist’s
Race

Trooper Race
White

Black

Hispanic

p-value

Panel A: Search Rate Given Stop (%)
White

Black

Hispanic

0.96

0.27

0.76

(6.68E-4)

(7.73E-4)

(9.26E-4)

1.74

0.35

1.21

(1.30E-3)

(1.42E-3)

(2.28E-3)

1.61

0.28

0.99

(1.46E-3)

(0.76E-3)

(3.03E-3)

< 0.001

< 0.001

< 0.001

Panel B: Average Search Success Rate (%)
White

Black

Hispanic

24.3

39.4

26.0

(9.43E-3)

(5.57E-2)

(2.28E-2)

19.9

26.0

20.8

(1.26E-2)

(5.32E-2)

(2.67E-2)

8.5

21.0

14.3

(9.78E-3)

(4.55E-2)

(6.63E-2)

< 0.001

< 0.001

< 0.001

Table 5: Search Rates and Average Search Success Rates by Races of Motorists and Troopers in
the Artificial Data Sets.
Note: Standard errors of the means are shown in parentheses.
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3.2.4

Test for Racial Prejudice

We have so far provided strong evidence that troopers do not exhibit monolithic search criteria
when deciding whether to search motorists of a given race. Now we describe the results from our
test for racial prejudice as described in subsection 2.1.2. Under the null hypothesis that none of
the racial groups of troopers are racially prejudiced, we argued that the rank order over the search
rates γ (rm ; W ) , γ (rm ; B) and γ (rm ; H) , and the rank order over the average search success rates
S (rm ; W ) , S (rm ; B) and S (rm ; H) , should both be independent of rm . From the estimated mean
search rates and average search success rates in Table 5, we have for all rm ∈ {W, B, H} ,
\
\
\
γ (r
m ; W ) > γ (rm ; H) > γ (rm ; B),
\
\
\
S (r
m ; W ) < S (rm ; H) < S (rm ; B).
We can use simple Z-statistics to formally test that
γ (rm ; W ) > γ (rm ; H) > γ (rm ; B) ,

(5)

S (rm ; W ) < S (rm ; H) < S (rm ; B) .

(6)

For example, let the null hypothesis be γ (rm ; W ) = γ (rm ; H). We can test it against the one-sided
alternative hypothesis γ (rm ; W ) > γ (rm ; H) by using
Z=

\
\
γ (r
m ; W ) − γ (rm ; H)
q
SVarW
SVarH
nW + nH

where nW and nH are the number of stops conducted by white and Hispanic oﬃcers respectively
against race-rm motorists, and SVarW and SVarH are respectively the sample variances of the
search dummy variables in the samples of stops against race-rm motorists conducted by white and
Hispanic oﬃcers. By the Central Limit Theorem (due to our large sample size), Z has a standard
normal distribution under the null hypothesis. The null will be rejected in favor of the alternative
at significance level α if Z ≥ zα where Φ (zα ) = 1 − α. When rm = W, the value of the Z-statistic
is 27.4 under the null, thus we can reject it in favor of the alternative γ (W ; W ) > γ (W ; H) at
significance level close to 0. Similarly, for the test of the null hypothesis γ (W ; H) = γ (W ; B)
against γ (W ; H) > γ (W ; B) , we obtain a Z-statistic of 65, thus again rejecting the null in favor
of the alternative. Implementing this test to other races of motorists, we find that the evidence
supports inequality (5).
27

We can use an analogous Z-test to formally test inequality (6) by using
Z0 =

\
\
S (r
m ; W ) − S (rm ; H)
r
∼ N (0, 1) ,
SVar0W
SVar0H
+ n0
n0
W

(7)

H

where n0W and n0H are the number of searches against race-rm motorists conducted by white and
Hispanic oﬃcers respectively, and SVar0W and SVar0H are respectively the sample variances of the
search success dummy variables in the sample of searches against race-rm motorists conducted by
white and Hispanic oﬃcers. The null will be rejected in favor of the alternative at significance level
α if Z 0 ≤ −zα where Φ (zα ) = 1 − α. For example when we consider white motorists, we obtain a
Z-statistic of −324.1 for white and Hispanic oﬃcers, thus we are able to reject the null in favor of
the alternative S (W ; W ) < S (W ; H) at a significance level essentially equal to 0. Likewise, we can
reject the null S (W ; H) = S (W ; B) in favor of the alternative S (W ; H) < S (W ; B) at significance
level close to 0 (with a Z-statistic of −254). Implementing this test to other races of motorists, we
find that the evidence supports inequality (6).
To summarize, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that troopers are not racially prejudiced.
Of course, we would like to emphasize caution in interpreting our finding: while we do not find
definitive evidence of racial prejudice, it is still possible that some or all groups of troopers are
racially prejudiced. If the latter is true, then we have committed a type-II error as a result of the
weak test.
3.2.5

Other Implications from the Tests

It is interesting to note some additional implications from the tests we conducted above. First
of all, inequality (5) implies that the search criterion used by troopers against race-rm motorists
have the ranking
θ ∗ (rm ; W ) < θ∗ (rm ; H) < θ∗ (rm ; B) .
In light of Proposition 1, this implies a ranking over the search costs: for any rm ,
t (rm ; W ) < t (rm ; H) < t (rm ; B) .
That is, white troopers seem to have smaller costs of searching motorists of any race, followed by
Hispanic troopers. Black troopers have the highest search costs.
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Motorist’s

Search

Average Search

Race

Rate (%)

Success Rate (%)

0.81

25.1

(.090)

(.434)

1.35

20.9

(.115)

(.407)

1.34

11.5

(.115)

(.319)

White

Black

Hispanic

Table 6: Average Search Success Rates by Race of Motorists in the Raw Data.
Note: Standard errors of the means are shown in parentheses.

Second, as we mentioned at the end of subsection 2.1.1, our model is refuted if, for each rm ,
the rank order of the search rates against race-rm motorists γ (rm ; W ) , γ (rm ; B) and γ (rm ; H)
is not exactly the opposite of the rank order of the corresponding average search success rates
S (rm ; W ) , S (rm ; B) and S (rm ; H) . As we showed above, the statistical evidence in our data does
not refute our model.
3.2.6

Replicating KPT’s Test

Finally, we would like to contrast our findings with those from KPT’s test. Recall that KPT’s
test relies on the prediction from their model that, under the null hypothesis of no racial prejudice,
the average search success rates should be independent of the motorists’ race. Table 6 shows the
search rate and average search success rate for diﬀerent races of the motorists in the raw data,25
and Table 7 shows the p-values from Pearson’s χ2 test on the hypothesis that the search rates
and average search success rates are equal across various race groupings. Their test immediately
implies that the troopers show racial prejudice against black and Hispanic motorists, especially
the Hispanics. However, as we argued, this conclusion is only valid if their model of motorist and
trooper behavior is true.
25

While KPT’s model does make predictions of the search rate, their test does not utilize such information. In

fact, they do not have the search rate information in their application to the Maryland data since their data consist
of searches only. We include the search rate information in the tables for informative purposes only.
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Search

Average Search

Rate

Success Rate

White, Black, Hispanic

< 0.001

< 0.001

White, Black

< 0.001

< 0.001

White, Hispanic

< 0.001

< 0.001

Black, Hispanic

0.798

< 0.001

Groupings

Table 7: p-Values from Pearson’s χ2 Tests on the Hypothesis that Search Rate and Average Search
Success Rate are Equal Across Various Groupings.

4

Conclusion
Black and Hispanic motorists in the United States are much more likely than white motorists to

be searched by highway troopers. Is this apparent racial disparity driven by racist preferences by
the troopers, or by motives of eﬀectiveness in interdicting drugs? Our paper presents a simple but
plausible model of police search behavior, and we define racial prejudice, statistical discrimination
and monolithic trooper behavior within the confines of our model. We then exploit the theoretical
predictions from this model to design empirical tests that address the following two questions. Are
police monolithic in their search behavior? Is racial profiling in motor vehicle searches motivated
by troopers’ desire for eﬀective policing (statistical discrimination) or by their racial prejudice
(racism)? Relative to the seminal research in Knowles, Persico and Todd (2001), our model allows
troopers of diﬀerent races to behave diﬀerently, thus allowing us to examine non-monolithic trooper
behavior; moreover, our model does not yield, and the subsequent empirical test does not rely on,
the convenient, but in our view unrealistic, implication that all drivers of the same race carry
contraband with the same probability regardless of characteristics other than race, which is the
vital prediction underlying their tests. We also propose a resampling method to deal with raw
data sets where one of the major assumptions underlying our model and empirical tests is violated.
Our tests require data sets with race information about both the motorists and troopers. When
applied to vehicle stop and search data from Florida, our tests can soundly reject the null hypothesis
that troopers of diﬀerent races are monolithic in their search behavior, but fail to reject the null
hypothesis that none of the racial groups of troopers are racially prejudiced. Finally we would like
to emphasize that our test for racial prejudice is relatively conservative in that we may not always
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conclude there is racial prejudice when it is actually present. Although our test is a low-power one,
which implies a high probability of type-II error will occur, the positive side of this is that when
we do find evidence of racial prejudice it is rather conclusive.

A

Appendix: A Model with Endogenous Drug Carrying Decisions.
In Section 2 we assumed that the proportion of motorists in race group rm is exogenously given

as πrm ∈ (0, 1) . For the purpose of testing for monolithic behavior and racial prejudice, this partial
equilibrium approach suﬃces. However, for other purposes such as public policy considerations
like reducing crimes and the “war on drugs,” one may want to know how any changes in trooper
behavior may aﬀect the motorists’ drug carrying decisions.26 One needs an equilibrium model
to address such questions. In this appendix, we propose a simple model. We show that closing
our partial equilibrium model in Section 2 is easy; moreover, such an equilibrium model has nice
equilibrium uniqueness properties under reasonable conditions. This is in contrast to the labor
market statistical discrimination models where multiple equilibria naturally arise and are the driving
force for statistical discrimination (see, among others, Coate and Loury 1993).
Consider a single motorist race group rm , and two trooper racial groups, rp and rp0 .27 Suppose
that in the trooper population a fraction α is of race rp and the remainder fraction 1 − α is of race

rp0 . Suppose that Nature draws for each driver a utility cost of carrying contraband v ∈ R+ from

CDF G with a continuous density. The utility cost v represents feelings of fear experienced by a
driver from the act of carrying contraband. If a driver carries contraband and is not caught, he/she
derives a benefit of b > 0. If a guilty driver is searched and thus arrested, he/she experiences an
additional cost (over and above v) of cg . If a driver does not carry contraband, he/she does not
incur the utility cost of v. But the inconvenience experienced by an innocent driver when he/she is
searched is denoted by cn . Naturally we assume that cg > cn . We assume that a driver’s realization
of v is his or her private information; b, cg and cn are constants known to all drivers and police
26

See Persico (2002) for an analysis on how racially blind search policies may aﬀect the total crimes committed by

motorists.
27

Because we are only considering one race group of motorists, we will omit rm from the subsequent notation.

Having more than one racical groups of motorists will not change any of the results below.
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oﬃcers. Each driver decides whether to carry contraband.
As before, we normalize the benefit of each arrest to the police oﬃcer to be one, and for
notational simplicity, the cost of search for a race-rp trooper is written as tp ∈ (0, 1) and that for
a race-rp0 trooper is t0p ∈ (0, 1) . As in Section 2, troopers observe noisy but informative signals

regarding whether or not a driver is carrying contraband: if a driver is guilty, the signal θ ∈ [0, 1] is
drawn from PDF fg (·) ; if the driver is not guilty, then θ is drawn from PDF fn (·) . As before fg /fn
is strictly increasing in θ. Let Fg and Fn denote the corresponding CDFs of fg and fn . We assume
that a trooper wants to maximize the total number of convictions minus the cost of searching cars.
We first suppose that a proportion π of drivers choose to carry contraband and analyze the
optimal search behavior of the troopers. Let Pr (G|θ) denote the posterior probability that a driver
with signal θ is guilty of carrying illicit drugs, which is given by
Pr (G|θ, π) =

πfg (θ)
.
πfg (θ) + (1 − π) fn (θ)

A race-rp trooper will decide to search a driver with signal θ if and only if
Pr (G|θ, π) − tp ≥ 0;
which, from the MLRP, is equivalent to θ ≥ θ ∗p (π) where θ ∗p (π) ∈ [0, 1] is the unique solution to
Pr (G|θ, π) = tp .
Obviously θ ∗p (π) is strictly decreasing in π. Similarly, race-rp0 troopers will search a motorist if and
only if the motorist’s signal θ exceeds θ∗p0 (π) where θ∗p0 (π) solves
Pr (G|θ) = t0p .
Now suppose that race-rp and race-rp0 troopers use search criteria of θ ∗p and θ∗p0 respectively.
The expected payoﬀ of a driver with utility cost v from carrying contraband is given by
Term 1

Term 2

z£
}|
z £
}|
¡ ¢
¡ ¢¤ { ©
¡ ¢¤
£
¡ ¢¤ª {
αFg θ∗p + (1 − α) Fg θ∗p0 b − α 1 − Fg θ∗p + (1 − α) 1 − Fg θ∗p0
cg − v

where Term 1 is the probability of not being caught multiplied by the benefit from drugs if the
motorist is not caught. Note that a fraction α of the troopers are of race-rp and use a search
criterion of θ ∗p , and 1 − α of the troopers use θ∗p0 . Thus the expected probability of not being caught
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¡ ¢
¡ ¢
is αFg θ∗p + (1 − α) Fg θ∗p0 . Term 2 is the expected probability of being caught multiplied by the
cost of being caught with illicit drugs. Of course, the driver suﬀers a disutility v whenever he or
she carries drugs.
The expected payoﬀ of a driver, whose utility cost is v, from not carrying contraband is simply
the inconvenience cost of being searched by mistaken troopers:
© £
¡ ¢¤
£
¡ ¢¤ª
− α 1 − Fn θ∗p + (1 − α) 1 − Fn θ∗p0
cn .

Thus a driver with utility cost realization v will decide to carry illicit drugs if and only if v ≤
¡
¢
v∗ θ∗p , θ∗p0 where

¡
¢
£
¡ ¢
¡ ¢¤
© £
¡ ¢¤
£
¡ ¢¤ª
v ∗ θ∗p , θ∗p0 = αFg θ∗p + (1 − α) Fg θ ∗p0 b − α 1 − Fg θ∗p + (1 − α) 1 − Fg θ ∗p0
cg
© £
¡ ∗ ¢¤
£
¡ ∗ ¢¤ª
+ α 1 − Fn θp + (1 − α) 1 − Fn θp0
(A1)
cn .

Thus if the troopers follow search criteria θ∗p and θ∗p0 respectively, the proportion of drivers who will
¡ ¡
¢¢
choose to carry contraband is given by G v∗ θ ∗p , θ∗p0 .
¢
¡
An equilibrium of the model is a triple π, θ∗p , θ∗p0 such that:
¡
¢
Pr G|θ∗p , π = tp
¡
¢
Pr G|θ∗p0 , π = tp0
¡ ¡
¢¢
G v∗ θ∗p , θ ∗p0
= π

(A2)
(A3)

(A4)

The existence of equilibrium follows directly from Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem. Now we show
that in fact for any CDF G with non-negative support (i.e., v ∈ R+ ), the equilibrium is unique.
Suppose that there are two equilibria in which the proportion of guilty motorists are π and π̃ with
π > π̃. Observe from (A1) that v∗ (0, 0) = cn − cg < 0 and
#
" ¡ ¢
¡
¢
¡ ∗ ¢ fg θ∗p b + cg
∂v∗ θ∗p , θ∗p0
¡ ¢
= αcn fn θp
−1 ,
∂θ ∗p
fn θ∗p cn
#
" ¡ ¢
¡
¢
¡ ∗ ¢ fg θ ∗p0 b + cg
∂v∗ θ∗p , θ∗p0
¡ ¢
= αcn fn θp0
−1 .
∂θ∗p0
cn
fn θ∗p0

´
³
¡
¢
∗
∈ [0, 1)2 such that v∗ θ∗p , θ ∗p0 is strictly inBy the MLRP, we know that there exists θb∗p , θc
0
p
³
´
¢
¡
∗
∗
creasing in both θ∗p and θ∗p0 when θ∗p , θ∗p0 > θb∗p , θc
0
p . Since v (0, 0) < 0 and the support
¡ ¡
¢¢
of G is non-negative, we have G (v∗ (0, 0)) = 0. Moreover, G v ∗ θ∗p , θ∗p0 will be zero for all
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´
´
¡ ∗ ∗ ¢ ³ b∗ c
¢ ³
¡
∗
θp , θp0 ≤ θp , θ∗p0 . Thus any θ∗p , θ ∗p0 ≤ θb∗p , θc
p0 cannot be part of the equilibrium (because if

π = 0, the optimal thresholds should be 1 from the troopers’ best response). Thus in both equilibria
´
³ ∗ ∗´ ³
´
¢ ³
¡
∗
∗
and θ̃ , θ̃ 0 > θb∗ , θc
. That is, both equilibria
of the model, we must have θ∗ , θ ∗0 > θb∗ , θc
0
0
p

lie in the region where

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

v∗ (·, ·)

is strictly increasing in both arguments. If π > π̃, equilibrium con³ ∗ ∗´
¡ ∗ ∗¢
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
ditions (A2) and (A3) imply that θp < θ̃p and θp0 < θ̃ p0 , therefore 0 < v θp , θp0 < v θ̃p , θ̃p0 .
But then it implies that π̃ > π, a contradiction.
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